In 2010, 21% of the total food available for consumption in the United States was wasted at the household level. In response to this waste, a number of counties and U.S. localities have instituted policies (disposal taxes) directed toward reducing this waste. However, currently there is no federal food-waste disposal tax. The aim of this paper is to establish a theoretical foundation for household food waste, and based on this theory, to determine the social-optimal food-waste (disposal) tax, along with a government incentive. The theory unravels the interrelation between social food insecurity and external environmental costs, which is not generally considered by households when they waste food. A social-optimal disposal tax and government incentive involve Pigovian mechanisms and governmental expenditures. For a zero level of food waste, the social-optimal disposable tax and government incentive approach infinity.
Food waste is an emerging regional, national, and global issue. In 2010, 21% of the total food available for U.S. consumption was wasted at the household level . In response, a number of countries and U.S. localities have instituted incentive mechanisms directed toward waste reduction. Two examples are South Korea and Seattle, Washington, both of which employ food-waste disposal taxes in excess of landfill costs (Mazzoni 2013; Kravitz 2015) . Currently, there are no federal food disposal taxes or government preservation incentive mechanisms. The Food Recovery Act (2016), which is currently in committee, would establish grant and loan programs to increase food-waste awareness, expand tax deductions for food donations, and require uniform labeling for sell-by dates (Food Recovery Act 2016) . The bill would aid in achieving the United States' and United Nations' goals, which aim for a 50% reduction in food waste by 2030 (USDA 2015; United Nations 2016) . This bill reduces the household costs of food preservation by subsidizing food preservation educational programs and awareness of alternatives to disposing of food as food waste.
The objectives of disposal taxes and/or government incentives (government mechanisms) are not always grounded in economics. Some opponents of food waste even have a zero food-waste objective (Riddlestone 2015) . This aim runs counter to marginal-economic analysis, which likely yields resource efficiency at some social-optimal positive level. Economic research on food waste is in the preliminary stages of measuring the degree of food waste within regions and documenting household and firm food-waste external costs. Examples include Aschemann-Witzel et al. (2015) , Buzby and Hyman (2012) , and Love et al. (2015) . Food-waste research is at the cusp of applying economic theory, which will yield hypotheses for empirical testing. Without this application of theory yielding social-optimal government mechanisms, the United States and United Nations food-waste goals may be difficult to reach.
As a first attempt at developing a theoretical foundation for household decisions, a theorem on social-optimal waste-disposal taxes and government incentives is derived. The theory incorporates a household's external costs associated with social food insecurity, environmental degradation, and government net spending on food-waste mechanisms. The aim is to unravel the interrelation between food insecurity and external environmental costs, which is not generally considered by households when they waste food. Based on this theory, the impact that external costs have on social-optimal taxes and government incentives are then investigated, along with the conditions necessary for this optimal tax yielding zero food waste.
Food Waste Literature
There is no universal definition of food waste. Hodges, Buzby, and Bennett (2011) and De Lucia and Assennato (1994) consider food waste in the context of post-harvest loss, which represents all quantitative and qualitative losses of food throughout the entire food-supply chain. This includes losses and waste occurring during production (harvesting), processing, transportation, packaging, storage, and consumption of food products. According to Buzby and Hyman (2012) , food waste can either be a result of natural factors including adverse weather conditions, which lead to changes of physical or chemical qualities of food products, or deliberate decisions to discard food. For instance, retail chains may be instructed to destroy their food stock if it is found to pose a threat to consumer health (Pleitgen 2011) .
There are few studies that attempt to estimate food loss. Due to data scarcity, studies often focus on particular geographical zones or certain stages of the food-supply chain. Buzby and Hyman (2012) estimate U.S. food waste at the retail and consumer level. Building upon their previous research on U.S. food waste, Buzby et al. (2011) aggregate data on more than 200 individual food products. Their results indicate that in 2008, the United States wasted $165.6 billion, or roughly one-third of the food supply. Fully 9% of available food was wasted at the retail level, while households wasted 22%.
Similarly, Hall et al. (2009) provide an estimation of the energy content of U.S. food waste from 1974 to 2003. These authors employed an inferential approach based on a mathematical model of human metabolism, which relates human-weight changes to the amount of food consumed. Their results suggest that household food waste increased from 30% to almost 40% of the total food supply during the examined time frame. These authors demonstrate that their findings are in contrast with the data published by the USDA, which employed the traditional approach of gleaning information on physical amounts of wasted food from public sources. According to USDA estimates, the proportion of household food waste remained at approximately 30% during the same period (Kantor et al. 1997) .
Geographically, Gustavsson et al. (2011) estimate the magnitude of food loss for seven geographical areas, effectively covering 127 countries. Employing data on production, waste, and losses collected from FAO reports, Gustavsson and his co-authors estimate that in 2007, approximately 1.3 billion tons of food products were lost or wasted at different stages of the global supply chain (approximately 30% of total production). In developed countries, some studies suggest that both retailers and households bear equal responsibility for increased food waste (Gustavsson et al. 2011; Hodges, Buzby, and Bennett 2011; Buzby and Hyman 2012) .
While the literature has provided an accounting of food waste, little research addresses the economics behind why food waste exists. A line of research will be required for developing of a comprehensive economic theory of food waste spanning the entire food supply chain. As a start, research effort is directed toward the household generation of food waste. Aschemann-Witzel et al. (2015) explore the factors that govern household behavior regarding food consumption, which might contribute to food waste. These authors find that households often dispose of commodities with minor visual imperfections or expiration dates. Food waste also occurs when households do not plan shopping routines carefully or are subject to impulse purchases. Government incentive mechanisms including information campaigns aimed at educating consumers to develop efficient shopping habits may be crucial for reducing household food waste.
The literature has also addressed disposal taxes, which raise the economic costs associated with waste-generating behavior and improper food disposal (Hodges, Buzby, and Bennett 2011) . Taxation of food waste is an important government mechanism that helps to internalize the external costs of environmental degradation and food insecurity.
As an initial foundation for developing an economic theory of food waste, de Gorter (2014) outlines the associated concepts and practical implications. This author's analysis reveals three divergences between private and social optimality (negative externalities, imperfect information, and non-optimizing agents). Government mechanisms for addressing this divergence are then theoretically investigated.
Available studies on food taxation leave the problem of food waste beyond their focus. For example, Chouinard et al. (2007) investigate the role that taxes play in the correction of poor nutritional habits. In particular, these authors explore the taxation of milk products with high fat content in the context of the U.S. obesity and heart disease epidemics. Employing a Generalized Almost Ideal Demand System, Chouinard et al. estimate elasticities for a variety of milk products to determine their exposure to a commodity tax. Their results suggest that a 10% ad valorem tax has almost no effect on fat intake, but instead generates measurable welfare loses.
The theory of social-optimal household taxation provides a framework for the derivation of second-best Pareto optimal taxes and government incentives, which explicitly account for negative externalities resulting from food waste. Recently, this theory has been primarily employed to explore the environmental impact of the automobile fuel industry. Parry and Small (2005) , for example, derive and compare optimal taxes on gasoline in the United Kingdom and the United States. Moreover, Vedenov and Wetzstein (2008) and Wu et al. (2012) apply the model developed by Parry and Small (2005) to derive the optimal U.S. ethanol and biodiesel subsidies, respectively.
Theoretical Model
The microeconomic theory of household food waste is developed based on the principles of consumer theory. Household-level food waste is considered as food excess due to improper food education (human capital) and food waste due to a lack of storage (physical capital). The main objective is to provide an intuitive treatment of household food-waste economics in a universal setting. With this treatment as a foundation, the goal is to guide empirical investigation in modeling household food waste through the development of a social-optimal disposal tax and government incentive.
1 Such treatment will direct the development of theoretically sound elasticity estimates and their application to food-waste policy. This will provide the first theoretical development of the welfare policies focused on mediating households' generation of food waste and society's social food-waste costs.
The theory employed for determining the optimal gasoline government mechanisms, such as an optimal tax (Parry and Small 2005; Vedenov and Wetzstein 2008; Wu et al. 2012) , is modified for developing the theoretical social-optimal disposal tax and governmental incentive. This theoretical foundation will be based on household determinants for food purchases along with social costs not considered by households.
Market conditions result in households generally purchasing more food than they will currently consume; households derive benefits from having excess food and reducing their shopping trips. This excess food may then be consumed at a later date, donated, or wasted. However, associated with the foodwaste portion are negative external costs, which households do not consider in their calculus. This indicates market inefficiencies associated with these food purchases. The major external costs are as follows: food insecurity (hunger); wasted resources in food production, transportation, and disposal; along with environmental external costs.
2 Of these, the resources employed in food production and transportation are pecuniary externalities, which do not yield market inefficiencies. However, food insecurity and environmental external costs are nonpecuniary externalities, which are not accounted for in marketderived food prices. Food insecurity results from food resources being directed toward food waste instead of food consumption. Environmental effects are in the forum of 1 Taxes and government incentives are not the only methods for internalizing externalities. For example, Coasian contracting is possible. However, when the externalities effect numerous agents, transaction costs preclude efficient Coasian contracting. Thus, efforts to internalize these externalities may require some type of government market intervention. The theoretical model then investigates employing taxes and government incentives as vehicles for government intervention.
2 Another possible external cost is over-nutrition (obesity), where overeating is considered wasted food. Internalizing this cost could require developing social-optimal fat taxes, which are tangential to developing an optimal disposal tax and government preservation incentive.
resources expended on food items that ultimately are wasted, resulting in air and water pollution, land allocation, and potential greenhouse gas emissions. With missing markets for food insecurity and negative environmental effects, there are no associated market prices. This suggests possible government market invention to provide the correct prices through a disposal tax, and government incentives.
The focus is to develop a household model addressing the problem of determining the social-optimal level of food waste and food preservation capital for reducing waste, along with the costs of food waste external to household decisions. Further, it is a static household decision problem, which embodies the characteristics of actual real-life decisions.
Consider the case of only one type of food waste, W, generated with the purchase of food, F. When purchasing food, households may intentionally purchase a level of food with the anticipation of having to waste a portion of it. Thus, F comprises a level of food that includes this wastage. Once the food is purchased, consumers attempt to enhance utility by reducing their level of food waste. This enhancement takes the form of employing preservation capital, such as refrigeration, to reduce food waste.
The generation of food waste is influenced by both the level of food purchases and amount of food-preserving capital employed. There are two types of preservation capitalhuman and physical. Examples of human capital are meal forethought prior to food purchases and knowledge of various foods' shelf lives. Physical capital includes proper storage facilities, including historical root cellars or refrigeration and animal suppression (pets and arthropods). The creation of food waste is then a function of household food purchases and food-preserving capital W ¼ WðF; XÞ where X represents a composite of food education (human capital) and preservation technologies (physical capital). It is assumed that @W/@F > 0, @ 2 W/@F 2 > 0, @W/@X < 0, and @ 2 W/@X 2 > 0. Household consumption of a food, C, may include a certain desired level of food waste beyond the physical human food intake. This may include some level of food loss in preparation (examples are apple cores and vegetable stems), the convenience of having food readily available (travel cost and time avoidance), and emergency food stocks with limited shelf lives. This desirability of food waste may increase with food purchases, so @W @F > 0: Assume a static model with many households who have in their decision calculus the amount of food to purchase, along with determining the level of food-preserving capital. Let a representative household's preferences be modeled as a quasi-linear utility function, U, associated with food waste ð1Þ U ðF; XÞ ¼ u½F -WðF; XÞ -dðPÞ:
À cðSÞ þ qðGÞ
Households can mitigate their food waste from food purchases by employing preservation capital, which enhances utility. Utility is then based on a household's consumption of food, C ¼ F -W. If X ¼ 0, then there are no efforts in mitigating food waste, so the level of food waste is at its maximum for a given level of food purchases, F. As X increases, food waste is decreased for a given F and utility is enhanced. At the point where the marginal benefit of enhanced utility equals the marginal cost of food preservation, the household has maximized utility for a given F, which yields the household's private optimal level of food waste. As X ! 1, all food waste is eliminated; food becomes a nonperishable commodity. The other variables are food environmental degradation, P, food insecurity, S, and government net spending on food-waste mechanisms, G. Variables P, S, and G are features of the household's environment, so the household perceives them as exogenous. Functions u and q are quasi-concave, with d and c being weakly convex representing disutility from environmental degradation and food insecurity.
With the presence of externalities, households ignore the effect of their own food waste on food insecurity, environmental degradation, and cost of government mechanisms. A household then attempts to maximize utility (1) subject to a budget constraint ð2Þ pF þ sWðF; XÞ þ rX ¼ I where p and r denote the per-unit price of food and food preservation capital, respectively, s is a per-unit food-waste disposal tax, and I represents household disposable income allocated to food, food-waste disposal, and waste-preventing efforts. Government mechanisms for influencing a household's level of food waste are a disposal tax, s, and government incentives. Government incentives are possibly in the form of a foodpreservation per-unit subsidy, which reduces the cost of food-preservation capital. An example is an extension outreach program reducing the cost of food-preservation educational materials. Alternatively, an extension program could reduce any information asymmetries with households' food-waste knowledge and practices relative to current foodpreservation prescriptions. Such reduced asymmetry through government programs would decrease the per-unit cost of household food-preservation capital.
To understand the economics behind the social-optimal food waste taxes and government incentives, the household responses to such mechanisms are first determined. Consider the indirect utility function ð3Þ Vðs; r; p; IÞ ¼ maxL ðF; XÞ ¼ maxu½F -WðF; XÞ þ k½I -pF À sWðF; XÞ -rX obtained by maximizing equation (1) subject to equation (2), where k is the Lagrange multiplier. The variables s and r then become parameters along with p and I. The first-order conditions (FOCs) for equation (3) are
From condition (4a), the additional monetary value of food consumption minus food waste is equal to its associated price, plus the marginal cost of waste disposal,
In condition (4b), the additional monetary value of consumption from preservation, À 1 k @u @C @W @X , plus the marginal benefit of reduced waste disposal from preservation, Às @W @X , is equal to the marginal cost of preservation, r. The effective food price, p f , is the food-market price plus the cost of disposal divided by the change in consumption from food purchases
From FOCs (4a and 4b)
given @u @C > 0 and p f > 0. Rearranging
The price of food preservation is composed of the per-unit cost of preservation, r, plus the incremental tax savings from preservation, s @W @X < 0: For household-utility maximization, this price of food preservation must equal the value of the marginal product of food preservation, Àp f @W @X > 0. As a complement to the welfare effects developed below, comparative statics and other relations associated with conditions (4a-4c) were developed in the form of propositions and a corollary. Interested readers can find these in a supplementary appendix online.
Welfare Effects
For this welfare analysis, consider a disposal tax, s, along with a government incentive, s, as a mechanism for enhancing food preservation capital. A standard welfare approach would allow the government to choose the tax and subsidy mechanism, which maximizes social welfare subject to household first-order conditions. This approach is largely equivalent to allowing the government to behave as a Stackelberg leader and the household as a follower. The dual to this approach is through a household indirect utility function, which states the maximum level of household satisfaction as a function of the government mechanism. Maximizing this indirect utility function over the disposal tax and government incentive yields the social-optimal mechanism. The external costs of food waste are then treated as additive terms outside the household budget constraint. As indicated in theorem 1 below, household responsiveness to the mechanism is captured in the elasticities of food waste and preservation to the government mechanism.
Considering this dual approach, the welfare effects of an incremental change in the government mechanism may be determined by totally differentiating the indirect utility function ð7Þ Vðs; rÞ ¼ maxLðF; X; kÞ ¼ maxu½F À WðF; XÞ-dðPÞ À cðSÞ þ qðGÞ þ k½I -p F À sW À rX:
Note that in contrast to equation (3), in equation (7) the household's externalities are now internalized into the calculus. The government incentive mechanism is intended as an incentive for households to implement food preservation capital, and can be considered a mechanism that reduces the cost of food preservation. In this sense, by converting the mechanism to a per-unit price of preservation, s; it may be represented as a reduction in household preservation cost, r. Government disposal-tax revenue minus incentive cost is then represented as
where W and X represent aggregate food waste and preservation, respectively.
Considering food insecurity, it is assumed that food insecurity due to food waste, S, is based on the aggregate level of food waste, W , where @S/@ W < 0
The environmental degradation of food waste, P, is decomposed into external costs of food production, Z, and disposal, D,
The envelope theorem may be employed for comparative statics analysis of equation (7). This yields 
From the FOCs of equation (7) From the definitions of P, S, and G in equations (10), (9), and (8), respectively,
a disposal tax and environmental degradation are inversely related,
a preservation price degradation are directly related,
a disposal tax and food insecurity are inversely related,
a preservation price and food insecurity are directly related,
Note that in all of the above expressions, the assumption is r ¼ r o À s, where r o is the price of preservation prior to a government incentive. Also, it is implicit that
For further analysis and interpretation, define the marginal costs of environmental degradation (external costs of food production and disposal) and insecurity as
The marginal external cost of food waste (MEC) is defined as the sum of the marginal costs of environmental degradation and foodinsecurity; it is the sum of food insecurity and environmental external costs, which are nonpecuniary externalities,
In determining the expressions in (12), aggregate food waste W and preservation X are no longer constant.
Substituting the expressions from (12) into those in (11) and dividing by k results in the marginal monetary welfare effect of the disposal tax and preservation mechanism
Based on equations (13a) and (13b), the social-optimal disposal tax and government incentive are derived.
THEOREM 1
The social-optimal household disposal tax and government incentive are
where as discussed in the supplementary appendix online e W;s and e X;s are the elasticities of food waste and preservation with respect to a disposal tax, respectively and e W;s ; and e X;s are the elasticities of waste and preservation with respect to the preservation subsidy, respectively.
Proof: Setting FOC (13a) to zero and multiplying by
Solving for s yields the social-optimal disposal taxes in (14a). Setting FOC (13b) to zero and multiplying by
Solving for s yields the social-optimal government incentives (14b).
As noted by Parry and Small (2005) , the social-optimal disposal tax and government incentive are only second-best, given that Theorem 1 equations (14a) and (14b) depend on parameter values at the social optimum and any observed values apply to the existing, possibly non-optimal, tax-incentive equilibrium. If the observed values of the parameters are far off from what they would be under social-optimal government mechanisms, then the calculation of the socialoptimal mechanism based on the observed parameters could be far off target. In this sense they are only second-best. In particular, as indicated in expression (14a), the socialoptimal tax s Ã is dependent on the level of government incentive s comes from. Similarly, the social-optimal government incentive s Ã in expression (14b) is dependent on the level of the tax s. For analytical determination of the social-optimal disposal tax and government incentive, equations (14a) and (14b) could be determined by dynamic policy iteration (Miranda and Fackler 2002) .
In investigating the expressions in (14), first address the denominator in (14a). The government marginal monetary welfare effect, q 0 /k, converts the reduction in food waste, W; into monetary government benefits. If e W;s ¼ À1, unitary, then an increase in the disposal tax, s; will yield no net change in government revenue, sW; so there is no marginal government welfare gain or loss. Instead, if e W;s is elastic (inelastic), then a decrease in s will increase (decrease) government revenue, yielding a denominator less (greater) than À1, which decreases (increases) the socialoptimal tax, s Ã . For a positive disposal tax, the denominator in expression (14a) must be negative. This implies
This is consistent with revenue-seeking institutions (firms and agencies) only operating in the elastic response area. The disposal tax should be increased until its elasticity is in the elastic range. Turning to the denominator in expression (14b), for a positive subsidy the denominator must be negative. The social-optimal government incentive can be considered in the form of a subsidy, but a negative subsidy (s < 0) is possible. An example of a negative subsidy is a commodity tax, where the consumer bears a portion of the taxes on food consumption. This also applies to human capital, for example with the taxing of education material. However, a reduction in this commodity tax will still reduce food waste. In general, the more responsive food preservation is to the subsidy, that is, the more elastic e X;s is, the lower will be the subsidy.
In terms of the numerators in (14a) and (14b), the social-optimal disposal tax and government incentive involve a Pigovian tax and subsidy, MECe W;s and MECe W;s W X ; respectively. The Pigovian tax (subsidy) is the external marginal cost from a per-unit change in food waste, MEC; times the weighted responsiveness of this waste to a change in the tax (subsidy), e W;s e W;s W X À Á . The more elastic (inelastic) food waste is to the tax, the higher (lower) the tax. Similarly, the social-optimal government incentive is also positive. The more elastic (inelastic) food waste is to the incentive, the higher (lower) the socialoptimal government incentive mechanism.
In addition to the own elasticity adjustments in the denominators of equations (14a) and (14b), there are supplementary Pigovian adjustments associated with the cross elasticities, the second terms in the numerators of equations (14a) and (14b). Increasing s will increase governmental expenditures by sX 1 W e X;s . Such government fiscal effects will mitigate the magnitude of the social-optimal disposal taxes, s Ã . For the social-optimal subsidy, s Ã , Corollary 1 in the supplementary appendix online indicates a loss in government revenue from food waste, W; and an associated increase in governmental expenditures. These fiscal effects will decrease the social-optimal government incentives, s Ã : The social-optimal disposal tax and government incentive in Theorem 1 are explored with the following corollaries. From Proposition 2 in the supplementary appendix online e X;s > 0; so e s;s < 0; an increase in s will decrease s. From Corollary 1 in the supplementary appendix online e W;s < 0, so consistent with e s;s < 0; e s;s < 0; an increase in s will decrease s. In both cases, taxes and government incentives are substitutes. This substitution relation is consistent with Proposition 1 in the supplementary appendix online.
where e G;s and e G;s denote the elasticity of government net expenditures on a disposal tax and government incentive with respect to the disposal tax s and government incentive, s, respectively.
Proof follows from expressions (13a) and (13b), and given (12e and 12f Proof follows from Theorem 1, equations (14a) and (14b). Perfectly elastic food-waste responses to the disposal tax and/or government incentive result in a complete household response, so the social-optimal tax or government incentive approach infinity. This results in zero food waste. Considering the monetary marginal benefits of government, q 0 k , a perfectly elastic food waste response to a disposal tax and/or government incentive would result in MEC being mitigated by government's marginal benefits. If e W;s < À1; elastic, then s Ã > 0; so government revenue will decline with a rise in a disposal tax. Considering this decline in government revenue for both a disposal tax and government incentive prevents social-optimal food waste declining to zero for perfectly elastic responses.
The results from Corollary 4 indicate proponents for zero food waste implicitly imply there are no governmental effects associated with waste mitigation and the household's food waste response is perfectly elastic. Otherwise, some positive level of food waste is socially optimal. This social-optimal foodwaste level can be derived from the elasticities of food waste with respect to the disposal tax and government incentive. The optimal government mechanisms, s Ã and s Ã , then yield the social-optimal percentage waste reduction, / Ã .
Implications
The implication of Theorem 1, that equations (14a) and (14b) yield the social-optimal percentage waste reduction, / Ã ; provides a rich field for the empirical investigation of government mechanisms to mitigate food waste. Empirical comparison of / Ã with the United States' and United Nations' current target of a 50% reduction by 2030 would indicate how close the target is to the social optimal. Estimating this possible cleavage would offer insights into the consideration of possible policy shifts. Such empirical investigations would reveal the magnitude of elasticities required for determining the social optimal, along with associated target government mechanisms of the United States and the United Nations. This would aid in comparing alternative sets of government mechanisms for achieving the social optimal or target levels of food waste. Without some explicit criteria such as Theorem 1 expressions (14a) and (14b), the likely success of developing the correct set of mechanisms is low.
In determining the social-optimal set of government mechanisms, Theorem 1 expressions (14a) and (14b) indicate that tax and government incentive are substitutes, although not perfect substitutes. The direction and magnitude of these effects are subject for empirical investigation.
Conclusions
Investigating the theory underlying household food waste and government mitigation mechanisms reveals the importance of measuring the responsiveness of food waste and household food preservation capital to a disposal tax and government incentives. Determining the social-optimal level of these government mechanisms is directly dependent on measuring these elasticities. The theoretical development also reveals the importance of considering government revenue derived from a disposal tax and expenditures in developing and implementing a government incentive to reduce food waste. If society is serious about reducing food waste to acceptable targets (50% less by 2030), then the mission of economists is to develop optimal mechanisms for achieving these targets. The presented theoretical analysis is a static foundation for determining the steadystate level of government mechanisms. The implementation of such mechanisms would require theoretical and empirical analysis on the optimal phasing-in of these mechanisms. That is, what is the social-optimal government mechanism-set trajectory to the steady state?
The theoretical results provide the first insights into developing an efficient set of governmental mechanisms, which adjust prices toward an optimal level of social food waste. The simultaneous development of a socialoptimal disposal tax and government incentive yields insights into their substitutability and complementarity characteristics. With this food-waste theory as a foundation, further theoretical and empirical efforts will unravel the complex economic and environmental nature of food waste. Only then will efficient economic solutions be revealed. In particular, with the theory of household food waste as a foundation, the theory may be extended up the supply chain, and possible substitution and complementary characteristics spanning supply-chain levels can be revealed.
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